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Abstract
The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques
used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be con-
structed blindly, i.e., without system knowledge; including topological connectivity and line reactance in-
formation. Our analysis reveal that existing FDI attacks become detectable (consequently unsuccessful) by
the state estimator if the data contains grossly corrupted measurements such as device malfunction and
communication errors. The proposed sparse optimization based stealthy attacks construction strategy over-
comes this limitation by separating the gross errors from the measurement matrix. Extensive theoretical
modelling and experimental evaluation show that the proposed technique performs more stealthily (has less
relative error) and efficiently (fast enough to maintain time requirement) compared to other methods on
IEEE benchmark test systems.
Keywords: Smart grid, false data injection, blind attack, principal component analysis (PCA).
1. Introduction
Recently, smart grid cyber-security has come to the forefront of national security priorities. Several
power system anomalies have been attributed to cyber-attacks, highlighting the importance of research on
the impact of new kinds of attacks on complex power systems. Nation states and utilities are increasingly
concerned about power system integrity, privacy and confidentiality, particularly in the aftermath of the
infamous ‘Stuxnet worm’ [1] attack in 2010. Recently, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency
Response Team (ICS-CERT) reported that among the 245 cyber incidents across all sectors of the critical
infrastructure in the fiscal year 2014, the majority (32% or 79 incidents) were in the energy sector [2]. In
today’s smart grid, the physical energy system and the information and communications technology based
cyber system are highly coupled which introduces new security threats.
The state estimator (SE) is a key operational module used in a smart grid energy management system
(EMS) to estimate the power system states (e.g., voltage magnitudes and angles) from sensor measurements
by minimizing estimation error. A bad data detector module (BDD) works in conjunction with the SE
module to identify any anomalies in the measurement data [3]. Recent studies have revealed that these
critical operational modules (e.g., SE and BDD) are vulnerable to a class of cyber-attack [4, 5, 6], known as
a false data injection (FDI) attack. In a seminal work [4], Liu et al. have shown that an attacker can construct
a stealthy FDI attack that cannot be detected by traditional anomaly detection modules (BDD) of an EMS.
Due to this hidden FDI attack, the SE estimates wrong system states, which misleads the system operator in
taking wrong operational decisions that can lead to degradation of the system efficiency, reliability and may
trigger cascading failures. Hence, significant research has been carried out on FDI attacks to investigate their
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stealthiness and construction strategies [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 5, 15], along with prospective detection
and prevention measures [16, 11, 9, 17, 18]. The objective of this work is to demonstrate circumstances
when attacks no longer remain stealthy, and a potential strategy that an attacker can apply to circumvent
it. Next, we provide more background on this problem followed by a discussion on the significance and
novelty of the proposed approach.
1.1. Related Work
There is a growing number of research papers on different aspects of FDI attacks. While some (e.g, [7, 5])
consider that all measurement devices are vulnerable to cyber attacks, others assume that a subset of
measurement devices are compromised [19]. Some attack detection strategies, e.g., Liu et al. assume that
phasor measurement unit (PMU) data is not compromised and build their model around this assumption [20,
21]. Examples of PMU attack include false data injection, and GPS based spoofing attack. For example,
intelligent cyber-attackers can gain access through networked devices and gain the access to PMU by false-
using of IP Multicast routing protocols [22]. In addition, authors describe in detail [23] how a GPS based
PMU can be attacked and wrong data can be injected. In [23], it was reported that currently there are no
defences available against these types of PMU attacks. Apart from the PMUs, supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) protocols (e.g., modbus), that is widely used to collect remote sensor data, are also
vulnerable to cyber attacks [24].
There are mainly two classes of FDI attacks: one class of attacks make the assumption that various
degrees of the system knowledge is known to the attacker, (e.g., network topology, branch and node in-
formation, etc.) that can be used for attack construction [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]; another class of FDI attack
relaxes the requirement of prerequisite knowledge and these attacks are more realistic [5, 25]. For example,
in [7], it is discussed how an FDI attack can be constructed using power system information which includes
power system topology and line parameters, known as the system Jacobian. Based on the system Jacobian,
an attacker can introduce arbitrary errors in the calculation of the state variables by the state estimator
module, through injection of false information into sensor measurement data. In [8], an efficient algorithm
using a graph theoretic approach was proposed that can construct an stealthy attack. Another graph based
attack strategy utilizing power system topology was proposed in [9]. A data framing FDI attack was pro-
posed in [10], where it was shown that an attacker can inject data in such a way that the EMS identifies
correctly functioning measurement devices as a false data injection source. In our previous work [26], we
have described a relationship between the power system stability indices and the FDI attacks in a smart
grid environment when the attacks are injected through smart meters. In [11], an attack was defined that
maximizes the deviations of the system states. In [12], a collective sparse attack strategy was proposed
where state variables in the same cluster are attacked by the same attack vector. However, in a real-world
system, it is very difficult to obtain the detailed system information required by these types of FDI attacks.
To overcome this limitation, authors in [27] assume that the attacker has partial or limited information
about the system topology and power system parameters. In [13], a method based on independent com-
ponent analysis (ICA) was proposed to construct a stealthy attack with low detection rate. In that work,
it was assumed that the attacker has no knowledge of the system information and a stealthy attack was
constructed based on the measurement matrix. A similar method for attack construction considering both
full measurements and partial measurements was proposed in [14]. Another data-driven attack that did not
need any prior system Jacobian information, is studied in [5]. In [14, 5], the authors show that a power
system knowledge-free FDI attack can be constructed using a subspace method which exhibits stealthiness.
Most recently in [5], the authors proposed a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based blind FDI attack
construction strategy that was shown to successfully and stealthily attack the system by the measurements
using its subspace information. There are two main drawbacks of this approach. First, the key parameter of
the PCA based approach requires the proper selection of the dimensionality parameter, which requires the
knowledge of the total number of states of any system (rank of Jacobian matrix). Since the total number of
states of a system is unknown to an outside attacker, this strategy cannot be used as a zero knowledge based
attacks. Second, these data-driven attack strategies assume that the measurements are noiseless or include
random noise that follows Gaussian distribution. However, like other application areas (e.g., image process-
ing, bio-informatics), gross errors (e.g., errors that do not follow Gaussian distribution) are also ubiquitous
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in smart grid measurement data due to sensor failures or communication errors. Theoretically, it has been
proven [28] that the accuracy of PCA is affected if the data contains gross errors. Furthermore, in Section
6.3, we demonstrate that PCA based attack strategies are ineffective in the presence of gross errors.
1.2. Contribution
In the context of stealthy attack generation without system knowledge (e.g., topology, system states),
this paper has the following contributions to the state-of-the-art research:
(1) Existing attack strategies (see section 3) require the system Jacobian matrix H, which represents
the interconnectivity information (as well as resistance/reactance values) of all the buses and branches of a
power grid. Recent techniques have emerged, where an adversary can construct a blind attack without the
system Jacobian information H. However, as discussed in the first drawback of existing literature in Section
1.1, these techniques [14, 5] assume that the number of system states—that is the rank of H [5] —is known
to the adversary. In practice, neither the information H nor the number of system states (n) is available to
the adversary. This paper proposes a technique that can create an attack vector without knowing H or n.
(2) Existing FDI attack techniques assume that the measurement data contains only Gaussian noise.
However, as discussed in the second drawback of existing literature in Section 1.1, previous research did not
consider device malfunction or missing data, which we refer to gross error. With extensive experiments, we
demonstrate in Section 6.3 that existing data-driven FDI attacks do not remain stealthy in the presence of
gross errors.
(3) This paper presents a blind FDI attack construction strategy in the presence of gross errors and
Gaussian noises using sparse optimization technique. We show that the proposed attack construction tech-
nique using augmented lagrange multiplier (ALM) method can generate stealthy FDI attacks successfully
in the presence of grossly corrupted measurements.
(4) We also evaluate the performance of the ALM based technique with three other effective sparse
optimization techniques: accelerated proximal gradient (APG) [29], singular value thresholding (SVT) [30]
and the dual method [29]. Extensive experimental evaluation on benchmark IEEE test systems, the ALM
based attack construction technique shows its effectiveness over other exixting methods in terms of both
accuracy and efficiency.
The organization of this paper is as follows- in Section 2, a smart grid measurement model is discussed
which provides the background on the SE and BDD module. In Section 3, an adversary model is presented,
where we first review the attack strategies that need power system Jacobian knowledge. Data-driven blind
attack strategy is discussed in Section 4. The proposed attack strategy in the presence of grossly corrupted
measurements is presented in Section 5. Extensive experimental results considering benchmark test systems
and multiple scenarios are presented in Section 6. The paper concludes with some brief remarks in Section 7.
The terms and their explanations used in the paper are listed in Table 1.
2. Preliminaries on Smart Grid Measurement Model
The real-time operation of an energy management system (EMS) depends on the measurement data
obtained from a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The operational functionalities
(optimal power flow, economic dispatch, contingency analysis, etc) of a smart grid require knowledge of the
power system states (typically, voltage magnitudes and angles) for making real-time operational decisions.
However, power system measurement signals are often noisy and subject to missing values. For reliable power
system operation, treatment of measurement data is necessary to obtain system states by removing noises
and anomalous data. In an EMS, the state estimator (SE) and bad data detector (BDD) are responsible for
performing these tasks. In the presence of Gaussian noise (which is widely used in the literature as these
types of errors are common in measurement data), the measurement vector z can be represented as:
z = h(x) + e (1)
where h(·) is the system Jacobian matrix which defines the non-linear relationship of the measurements
and the system states (x). Here, e is a vector of zero mean Gaussian noise elements. Generally, it is
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Table 1: Glossary of Terms
Notation Description Notation Description
z Vector of original measurement z′ Vector of compromised measurement
x vector of original system states x′ vector of compromised system states
e vector of gaussian noises u vector of principal components
apca attack vector r residual vector
ψ degree of freedom τ bad data detection threshold
m total number of measurement devices n total number of system states
σi standard deviation of i
th measurement λ sparsity regularization parameter
Hpca reduced PCA transformation matrix M˜ PCA transformation matrix
M measurement matrix with gross errors
and gaussian noises
A low-rank measurement matrix with-
out gross errors
E sparse gross error matrix H system Jacobian matrix
γ Lagrange multiplier µ dual variable
U,V unitary matrix of SVD operation S diagonal matrix of SVD operation∑
covariance matrix I Identity matrix
ξ soft-thresholding operator Pmis probability of false negative
C(X) column space of X E(X) expected value of X
SE state estimation FDI false data injection
ALM augmented Lagrange multiplier PCA principal component analysis
ICS industrial control system CERT cyber emergency response team
EMS energy management system BDD bad data detectot
PMU phasor measurement unit GPS global positioning system
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition WSSE weighted sum of squared error
ICA independent component analysis APG accelerated proximal gradient
DC direct current SNR signal-to-noise ratio
IP internet protocol LNR largest normalized residual
SVT singular value thresholding SVD singular value decomposition
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assumed that the noise elements are independent (so,
∑
e
=R=diag{σ21, σ
2
2 , ..., σ
2
m}) [3], where σi is the
standard deviation of each measurement i. Generally, Direct Current (DC) power flow model is widely
used by the power engineers as well as Smart Grid cyber-security researchers [5, 14, 20] to describe the
linear approximation of Alternative Current (AC) [3] power flow model. The DC approximation is widely
accepted as a substitute for AC model because (i) it guarantees faster convergence; (ii) reduces algorithmic
complexities of power flow analysis, (iii) particularly used for transmission system analysis as it produces
highly accurate results [3, 7]. Considering a DC approximation, the linearized measurement model becomes
as follows [3, 5]:
z = Hx+ e (2)
where H is the system Jacobian matrix. For m number of measurement devices and n system states, the
dimension of H matrix is m× n. A system will be observable if H is a full rank matrix which leads to the
assumptions that m ≥ n and rank(H)=n [14].
2.1. The State Estimator
In the state estimator module, the system state vector x is obtained using a weighted least square (WLS)
estimator which can be formulated as follows:
argmin
x
J(x) =
1
σ2
‖z−Hx‖2
2
(3)
where the difference between z (measurement data) and Hx (H is the system Jacobian and x is the system
states) is called the residual r [3].
r = z−Hx (4)
The problem formulated in (3) can be solved iteratively (e.g., using gradient based Newton’s method) [3].
2.2. The Bad Data Detector
In a power system BDD, the chi-square (χ2) test is widely used to detect bad measurement data [3, 31].
As it is assumed that noise samples follow a normal distribution with zero mean and they are independent,
J(x) will follow a (χ2) distribution with a ψ degree of freedom, where (ψ = m − n) [3]. Considering a
desired significance level (e.g., 95%), a threshold- χ2(m−n),p from the chi-square distribution can be obtained.
If there exists an anomalous (bad) data, the value of J(x) ≥ χ2(m−n),p. Once the existence of anomalous
data is determined, then the largest normalized residual (LNR) test is employed to identify the corrupted
data [3, 32]: {
bad data exists, if max ( 1
σ2
|r(i)|) > τ
no bad data, otherwise
(5)
where i ∈ Rm and τ is the bad data detection threshold [3]. In the existing BDD module, an ‘alarm’ is
raised if any bad data is detected. Next, the bad data is removed from the measurement vector and the
state estimator re-computes the states followed by a BDD operation. This task is continued until all the
bad data have been removed.
3. The Adversary Model with known System Jacobian
Adversary models for FDI attacks can be classified into two broad categories- (i) a model that requires
knowledge of system parameters and topology (system Jacobian), (ii) a model that does not require any
information about the system Jacobian. In this section we review the prior model which was proposed by
the Liu et al. [4]. According to that model, an attacker with system knowledgeHm×n can strategically inject
an attack vector am×1 with the measurement signals zm×1 which cannot be identified by the traditional SE
and BDD modules [4]. Suppose, for an attack vector am×1, the new corrupted measurements become z
′
m×1
=zm×1 +am×1. Based on this manipulated measurements, the SE module will produce wrong system states
x′m×1 instead of the original states xm×1. The mismatch of system states is considered as c, where x
′= x
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+ c. Liu et al. shows both theoretically and experimentally that the attack remains hidden if the attack
vector satisfy the condition a=Hc [4]. Following this strategy, the residual of the estimation becomes as
below:
‖z′ −Hx′‖ = ‖z+a−H(x+c)‖
=⇒ ‖z′ −Hx′‖ = ‖z+a−Hx−Hc‖
=⇒ ‖z′ −Hx′‖ = ‖z−Hx‖ (as, a = Hc)
=⇒ rnormal = rattack
Here, the residual of the attack measurements (rattack) is the same as the one without any attack (rnormal).
Hence, the BDD module will fail to detect it using the current statistical testing used in the utilities.
Therefore, attack remains hidden which will change the system states affecting critical operational failures.
4. The Adversary Model with unknown System Jacobian- Blind Attack Strategy
4.1. Stealthy Attack using Measurements Only
Attack vector
MeasurementsSCADA
Control Signal
z
a
za
Energy System Operation Centre 
Physical energy grid
Attacker*
Measurement vector 
‘z’
z 1 z 2
z
m
z
1 z(1, 1) z(1, 2) … z(1, m)
2 z(2, 1) z(2, 2) … z(2, m)
… … … …
… … … …
t z(t, 1) z(t, 2) … z(t, m)
…
*Attack Strategy is discussed in Algorithm 2
… measurements ...
Figure 1: Overall architecture of the measurement signal based data-driven FDI attacks
The blind FDI attack strategy is a data-driven approach where the stealthy attack-vector is prepared
solely from the measurement matrix. For any blind attack strategy that requires measurement data, the
assumption is that all [5] or partial (by satisfying observability [14]) measurement data is available to the
attacker. An attacker can obtain the data by gaining access to the PMUs (as mentioned earlier in the
literature review [22]), using man-in-the-middle attack on data in transit (e.g., attacking the router, or by
spoofing as fake measurement devices, etc.) [33]. Hence, measurement data Z is known to the adversary.
Measurement signal based blind attack is possible because for a small range of time, the power system
consumptions (loads) vary in a small dynamic range [13]. Unless there is a reconfiguration of the system,
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power system topology remains the same. Hence, due to the slow dynamic nature for a short period of time,
the equivalent knowledge of the topology can be revealed using the correlations among multiple power flow
measurements [13, 5, 14]. Hence, the attacker monitors the measurement data vector z = [z1, z2, , zm], where
zi is the measurement of i-th device. Observing t number of measurement vectors, the attacker constructs
the measurement matrix Zt×m, where each row represents an observation of all measurement devices at
time t (see Fig. 1). Next, this measurement matrix is used to construct blind attack as discussed below.
Fig. 1 shows the conceptual diagram of how an attacker would construct the attack from measurement data
Z. The detailed technical procedure of attack construction strategy is also discussed in Algorithm 2.
Recently, Kim et al. in [14] shows that the subspace estimation method can be used successfully to learn
the system operating subspace without the need of system knowledge (e.g., topology and system parameters)
to generate FDI attacks. In another recent study, Yu et al. showed that PCA can be used to transform the
measurement data into a new subspace, preserving the spatial characteristics as much as possible [5]. Using
these approaches it is possible to construct FDI attacks based on the data of the new projected space. If
the column space of any matrix is represented as C(.), designing a stealthy attack is equivalent to finding a
nonzero vector in C(H) [14]. Therefore, kim et al. has pointed out that attack can be constructed using a
basis matrix of C(H) without knowing H [14]. Detailed procedure is explained below:
Consider the time-series measurement matrix Zt×m, where each row represents a time instant (observa-
tions) and each column corresponds to the measurement variables, the state vectors x1, ...,xd are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), and the noise vectors and the state vectors are uncorrelated. Then, the
covariance (ΣZ) of the measurement matrix becomes as follows [14]:
ΣZ , E[(Z− E[Z])(Z − E[Z])
T ] = H
∑
x
HT + σ2I (6)
Now the task is to find a basis matrix of C(H
∑
x
HT ). First, we perform a singular value decomposition
(SVD) of ΣZ and obtain unitary matrix U. The rank of H
∑
x
HT is n. So, n columns of U form a basis of
C(H
∑
y
HT ). As C(H
∑
x
HT ) is equivalent of C(H) [14], the same n columns of U form a basis of C(H). As
a result, attackers can construct attacks using the subspace information described above without knowing
the information of the original H matrix. More information and proof regarding this type of measurement
subspace based attack strategy can be obtained from [14].
PCA can also be used to design such blind attack as demonstrated in [5]. PCA is a multivariate
statistical technique widely used for dimensionality reduction and data transformation. It can transform
the correlated observations into uncorrelated variables which are known as principal components. These
orthogonal principal components are the linear combinations of the original observations. After a successful
PCA transformation, we obtain the vector of principal components u and the transformation matrix M˜ [5].
Therefore, the PCA relationship can be represented as:
M˜TZ = u (7)
Now, measurement matrix Z can be approximated by,
Z ≈


M˜1,1 M˜1,2 · · · M˜1,m
...
...
. . .
...
M˜n,1 M˜n,2 · · · M˜n,m
...
...
. . .
...
M˜m,1 M˜m,2 · · · M˜m,m




u1
...
un
...
um


(8)
where the principal components and corresponding eigenvectors are arranged based on their eigenvalues
in descending order. As the rank of the original H matrix is n, authors in [5] suggest to consider only n
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principal components. Hence (8) can be rewritten as follows:
Z ≈


M˜1,1 M˜1,2 · · · M˜1,n
...
...
. . .
...
M˜m,1 M˜m,2 · · · M˜m,n




u1
...
un

 (9)
≡ Hpcaupca (10)
where the reduced transformation matrix has been considered asHpca, which is then used for stealthy attack
construction. In that case, the attack vector will be,
apca = Hpcac (11)
where c is an arbitrary non-zero vector of length n [5]. Therefore, the attacked measurement vector becomes
zattack = z+ apca (12)
The proof of such stealthy attack strategy is given in [5].
4.2. Approximation of the Rank of the System Jacobian
During the PCA based attack construction, authors in [5] suggest to consider only n number of principal
components where n is chosen based on the rank of the system Jacobian H matrix. Similar consideration
is observed in [14]. As the rank of the Jacobian matrix is equal to the number of system states [5], attacker
can only get the information of the total number of system states if the system Jacobian H is known. If it is
assumed that the attacker has no knowledge on the H matrix, it is also logical to assume that the rank of the
H matrix, i.e., n is also unknown to the attacker. In this section, we describe a heuristic based on eigenvalue
analysis to approximate the rank of H matrix and use it to construct a stealthy attack in Section 5 when
n (number of system states) is not known. In Fig. 2, we plot the eigenvalues of the principal components
obtained from the measurement matrix using PCA for three IEEE benchmark test systems. Based on the
eigenvalues, the contribution of each component can be estimated in order to make an approximation of the
measurement subspace. In Fig. 2, we observe that the first few components have larger values compared to
the remaining components. We refer to these principal components as the influential principal components
and the total number of influential principal components are denoted by ρ. The dimension of the new
projected space is reduced by considering only ρ principal components and is calculated as follows:
Algorithm 1: Calculation of the number of influential principal components (ρ)
input: v, i.e., v = v1, .., vm is the vector of eigenvalues of m principal components
1 initialize
∏
=
∑m
i=1 vi, κ = 0 and counter ρ; while κ ≤ Γ do
2 κ = κ+ v(ρ)
3 increment ρ
4 end
Result: Output ρ
In Algorithm 1, the eigenvalues are arranged in descending order in vector v and ρ is the number of
influential principal components which is obtained using a precision threshold Γ by identifying the knee
of the scree plot [34] shown in Fig. 2. The precision threshold Γ determines the size of regular subspace
and approximates the noiseless measurement matrix. Here, Γ is a tunable parameter which is obtained
empirically using trial and error until a high successful stealthy attack construction rate is achieved. We
observe that the precision threshold value 0.995 leads to high successful rate of stealthy attack construction
(shown in Section 6). The Γ = 0.995 indicates that we consider 99.5% of the noisy measurement matrix
to approximate the regular subspace. As the noise vector is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d),
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Figure 2: Eigenvalue analysis of different sensor measurements for three benchmark test systems
the above eigenvalue based dimension selection approach will also suppress the noise. We observe that
the attacker can construct the attack based on the dimension (ρ), obtained using the eigenvalue analysis
explained above, which shows almost the same stealthy characteristics as for the case with known n. The
experimental validation is demonstrated in Section 6.
5. Attack in the presence of grossly corrupted measurements
In Section 4.2 and 4.1, we showed how to solve the problem of unknown system states and system
Jacobian information. In this section we show how to construct a stealthy FDI attack in the presence of
gross measurement errors in the data.
The data-driven attack described in the above sections is completely dependent on the measurement
data. In an industrial smart grid, corrupted measurement is fairly common in sensor data, due to device
malfunction and communication error. It is well established in theory that PCA cannot handle grossly
corrupted data [28, 35]. Furthermore, we demonstrate through experiments (see Section 6.3) that the
previously mentioned strategy (in Section 4.1 [14, 5]) does not work in the presence of gross errors. In this
section, we show how to construct a stealthy FDI attack even in the presence of gross errors. Typically,
grossly corrupted measurements are only a small fraction of the total number of measurements. Therefore,
gross error matrix can be considered as a sparse matrix. On the other hand, slowly varying system states
lead to a low-rank measurement matrix. Hence we utilize a low-rank and sparse matrix separation technique
to estimate the original low-rank measurement matrix by separating the gross errors. Next, the estimated
measurement matrix is used for attack construction. We formulate the problem as follows.
The original measurement matrix is a low rank matrix [20] and the gross errors can be assumed to
be sparse. Therefore, sparse optimization technique can be used to approximate the original low-rank
measurement matrix from the observed measurement matrix (with gross errors). If the original low-rank
measurement matrix is A, sparse matrix of missing values is E, and the observed measurement matrix with
gross errors is Z, then we can form the relationship as follows:
Z = A+E (13)
Now, we can formulate the problem as a matrix recovery problem and the exact recovery of A and sparse
E can be represented mathematically as [15]:
min ‖A‖∗ + λ‖E‖1, s.t. Z = A+E (14)
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In this convex optimization problem, ‖.‖∗ and ‖.‖1 denotes the nuclear norm and l1 norm of a matrix,
respectively, and λ is a positive weighting parameter [29]. To solve this problem, we use augmented lagrange
multiplier (ALM) [35] method as discussed below [25]:
The ALM method can be used for the general constraint optimization problem as follows:
min f(x), s.t. h(x) = 0 (15)
Using the ALM method, the objective function of the above optimization problem can be written as a
lagrangian function:
L(x, Y, µ) = f(x) + 〈γ, h(x)〉+
µ
2
‖h(x)‖2F (16)
where γ is the lagrange multiplier and µ is a positive scalar. Considering x = (A,E), f(x) = ‖A‖∗ +
λ‖E‖1 and h(x) = Z−A−E , the Lagrangian function can be written as:
L(A,E, γ, µ) = f(x) = ‖A‖∗ + λ‖E‖1 + 〈γ, (Z−A−E)〉 +
µ
2
‖Z−A−E‖2F (17)
The solution optimization process is driven by the following two update steps,
Ak+1 = arg min L(A,Ek, γk, µk) (18)
Ek+1 = arg min L(Ak+1,E, γk, µk) (19)
Eq. (18) can be computed from the soft-shrinkage formula [20], using an iterative thresholding (IT) approach
that uses the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the matrix (Z − Ek + µ
−1
k γk) [35]. After performing
the SVD, the unitary matrix U, V and the rectangular diagonal matrix S is obtained. Then, A is updated
as,
Ak+1 = Uξµ−1
k
[S]VT (20)
and E is updated as,
Ek+1 = ξλµ−1
k
[Z−Ak+1 + µ
−1
k λk] (21)
here λ = 1/
√
max(m, t) and ξ is a soft-thresholding (shrinkage) operator, defined as [35]:
ξε[x] =


x− ε, if x > ε
x+ ε, if x < −ε
0, otherwise,
(22)
During each of the iterations, γ and µ are updated as follows:
γk+1 = γk + µk(Z−Ak+1 −Ek+1) (23)
µk+1 = Ωµk (24)
where Ω is a positive constant. The optimization process continues until the convergence criteria is satisfied.
The convergence is checked based on the relative error using (25) against a tolerance, τ .
cidxk = ‖Z−Ak+1 −Ek+1‖F /‖Z‖F ; (25)
The proof of convergence of the ALM algorithm can be obtained from [35]. Once the algorithm has converged,
the principal component matrix, Hpca of the recovered measurement matrix A is obtained by following the
procedure discussed in Section 4.1. Next, we use (11) to construct an FDI attack. The whole procedure of
the FDI attack construction considering grossly corrupted measurements is presented in Algorithm 2.
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Figure 3: Location and types of power measurement sensors for an IEEE 14 bus test system.
Algorithm 2: ALM based FDI attack strategy
input: Grossly corrupted measurement matrix, Z
1 [A, E]=alm(Z) // use ALM based convex optimization to generate true measurement matrix A by
separating sparse gross error matrix E ;
2 [M˜,v]=pca(Z) // calculate M˜ and v using principal component analysis ;
3 Calculate ρ using the eigenvalue analysis following Algorithm 1;
4 Obtain Hpca using ρ principal components;
5 Generate a non-zero vector c of the length ρ and construct attack vector, apca = Hpcac ;
6 Calculate manipulated sensor measurements, zattack = z+ apca ;
Detailed Explanation of Algorithm 2: The detailed description of Algorithm 2 is analysed step by
step below:
Step 1: In this step, the attacker uses ALM based sparse matrix optimization technique [35] to sepa-
rate the gross errors (E) from the measurement matrix (Z) in order to obtain the gross-error free matrix (A).
Step 2: PCA transformation is then performed on the gross-error free matrix (A) to obtain a new
projected subspace of the measurements. Here, PCA provides the transformation matrix M˜ (that contains
all the m principal components), and corresponding eigenvalues in vector v, where v = v1, .., vm. In M˜,
the first column is the most informative principal component and the significance of principal components
decreases gradually as the column number increases.
Step 3: Using the eigenvalues from Step 2, and applying the heuristic described in Algorithm 1, we
obtain ρ which is used in next to generate stealthy attack.
Step 4: In order to generate an attack, we first obtain reduced transformation matrix HPCA from M˜
by taking the first ρ principal components using the approach discussed in Eq. (8)-(10).
Step 5: We construct the stealthy attack vector using apca = Hpcac of Eq. (11), where c [7] is a non-zero
Gaussian random vector of length ρ.
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Step 6: The injected attack vector (apca) modifies the original measurements (z) as, zattack = z+ apca
following Eq. (12).
6. Experimental Evaluation:
6.1. Test Systems:
All experiments were conducted using benchmark IEEE power systems, which include IEEE 14 bus, IEEE
30 bus and IEEE 57 bus test systems. Power system data can be obtained from [36, 37]. There is no known
publicly available real-world smart grid cyber-attack data [34]. Hence, realistic power system simulation
is carried out using Matlab based simulation tool MATPOWER [37]. MATPOWER is widely used for
simulating power system data and reflects a realistic simulation environment for the real-life complex power
systems [37, 13, 5]. The state estimation formulation and attack construction strategies are also implemented
in Matlab on a PC with an Intel(R) core i7 @ 3.4 GHz- 3.4 GHz processor and 16 GB of RAM.
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Figure 4: Sensor measurements and State variables are plotted for the no attack case in (a)-(b) and the
attack case with known system information in (c) and (d), respectively.
6.2. Comparison of different FDI attack strategies without gross errors (Contribution 1):
In this section, we evaluate the performance of different attack construction strategies and compare
their stealthiness against the case when no attack vector is injected. First, we consider a single scenario to
illustrate the attack strategies and then we consider a monte carlo simulation of 1000 runs to evaluate the
performance over a broad selection of scenarios and test setups. Here, we consider the voltage angles as
system states, which is obtained after a successful SE. The vector of measurement signals (z) is necessary for
SE operation, which is obtained from the power flow solution of the test system using MATPOWER. Now,
data-driven blind FDI attack needs multiple observations. Hence, 100 samples (observations) are generated
using the same mean of (z) with gaussian distribution similar to [14]. The impact of measurement noise
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is also considered by introducing zero mean Gaussian noise with the ideal power flow measurements. We
have considered signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) between 20 ∼ 35 db during the simulation. All the branch
power flows (both incoming and outgoing) and bus power injections have been considered to generate the
measurement vector. For example, the IEEE 14 bus test system has 20 line sections (branches) and 14 buses
(nodes). Therefore, the total measurements consist of 20 incoming power flow sensors, 20 outgoing power
flow sensors, and 14 power injection sensors (total 54 sensors). These sensors are shown in Fig. 3, where the
sensors are marked with individual symbols. Similarly, the IEEE 30 bus test system has 41 line sections and
30 buses which includes 112 measurement sensors. The IEEE 57 bus test system has 80 line sections and
57 buses, which includes a total of 217 measurement sensors. The IEEE 14 bus, 30 bus and 57 bus systems
have 13, 29 and 56 unknown system states, respectively. Note, the number of unknown system states is
always at least one less than the total number of buses as one bus is considered as a reference bus during
power flow simulation and removed from the unknown system state vector.
Attack construction using known system information: In our test setup, the IEEE 14 bus system
has 54 measurements and 13 states, which provides a degree of freedom of 41. Following a chi-square test
considering 95% confidence interval, the anomaly threshold for BDD module becomes 56.94 [3]. Under
normal operating conditions (no attack scenario), the estimated system states follow the true states. One
such scenario is shown in Fig. 4(a)-(b) which has a residual value of 39.88 (well below the threshold) obtained
using the IEEE 14 bus test system. Note that, Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) both contains two graphs each (one
for normal and the other for estimated), but due to superimposition the two graphs cannot be distinguished
(residual = 39.88). We simulate the attack strategy proposed by Liu et al. with known system information
(system Jacobian H) in Fig. 4 (c)-(d). From Fig. 4 (d), the estimated states are too far away from the
original system states and the SE module minimizes the cost assuming the attacked signal is the original
signal (see Fig. 4(c)). Interestingly, for the attacked case, we obtain the same residual value (39.88) although
the system states have been changed heavily. Thus, the attack remains hidden as the residual of the attacked
case is also below the threshold of the existing detection technique. Therefore, a successful attack can be
constructed using known system information.
Attack construction without system information: If the system information (system Jacobian H)
is not known, still the attack can be constructed based on the principal components of the measurement
subspace. The state vectors at different time instances are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
which follows a Gaussian distribution with mean equal to the operating point defined by the test system[14].
Here, 500 time instances were considered during the creation of the measurement matrix following the
relationship expressed in Eqn. 6. Measurement noise is considered to be between 20 ∼ 35 dB. The data-
driven FDI attack without power system knowledge is constructed using the method discussed in Section 4.1.
Fig. 5 shows the probability of false negative, Pmis (attack incorrectly identified as normal) under different
attack scenarios considering the IEEE 14 bus, 30 bus and 57 bus test systems, respectively. For each of
the three figures, we plot the following attack strategies- (1) FDI attack based on system knowledge H as
proposed by Liu et al [7], (2) blind FDI attack using PCA [5], (3) data-driven FDI attack using SVD [14],
(4) random attack without system knowledge and (5) ALM based proposed attack model.
In Fig. 5(a), first we plot the probability of detection for a normal scenario, referred to as the no attack
case, for the IEEE 14 bus test system considering both noiseless measurements (ideal) and measurements
with Gaussian noises (practical). Next, we simulate each of the above discussed attack strategies 1000 times
considering different noise vectors and plot the corresponding Pmis for different threshold values. We observe
that all attack strategies have almost the same stealthy nature as the no attack case except the random
attack strategy which performs very poorly. For any specific threshold value, the random attack without
system knowledge has the lowest Pmis. Therefore, it can be easily distinguishable from the no attack case.
Other than the random attack, all other attack strategies including our proposed method conform with the
no attack case and become indistinguishable in the existing BDD module. Similar observations were made
when performing experiments on the two other benchmark test systems which are plotted in Fig. 5(b) and
Fig. 5(c).
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Figure 5: Probability of misdetection versus the detection threshold for different attack strategies.
6.3. Inefficiencies of existing attack strategies in the presence of gross errors (Contribution 2):
In the previous section, we have shown that all the attack strategies (except the random attack) maintain
stealthy characteristics similar to that of the no attack case, and remain hidden, however, this observation
is only true when the measurement matrix does not have a missing value or grossly corrupted measurement.
We observe that, a stealthy FDI attack based on the PCA method becomes detectable by the State Estimator
detection modules if the measurement data contains one or more grossly corrupted measurement data or
missing value. This limitation of traditional PCA is discussed in [28]. Here, we show an example of the PCA
based attack using sensor measurements that contain only one single gross error. We consider the IEEE
14 bus test system and create a measurement matrix based on the operating conditions provided in the
test system using MATPOWER. The measurement matrix contains the measurements of 54 sensors for 500
different observations. Next, we consider a single gross error in the measurement matrix, which can be any
sensor value of any observation. We construct a PCA based blind FDI attack vector using the measurement
matrix. This process is repeated 100 times to generate different attack cases. All of the 100 cases are detected
as the residuals produced under this attack scenario are significantly larger than the detection threshold
of the BDD module. One such scenario is shown in Fig. 6, where the measurements and state variables
are plotted in (c) and (d) respectively. We see that the estimated state variables have different values
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Figure 6: Effect of PCA based FDI attack construction strategy on sensor measurements and estimated
state variables, without gross error (a)-(b) and with gross error (c)-(d), respectively.
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Figure 7: The ALM method approximates the true measurement matrix by separating the gross errors. The
left plot shows the corrupted measurements with gross errors and the remaining two are its decomposition
into a low-rank and sparse matrix, respectively.
than the true variables. However, the estimated measurements can not follow the attacked measurements
(which is assumed to be true at the utility’s detection module), which leads to a high estimation error
(residual). For example, for this specific case, the Weighted Sum of Squared Error (WSSE) is 5.33 ∗ 103 and
the detection threshold is 56.94. Therefore, the attack is easily detectable using the existing BDD module.
If the measurement matrix does not include that gross error, we obtain the plots of Fig. 6 (a) and (b) for
the same experimental setup. From those figures, we see that the estimated state variables are far away
from the true states but the estimated measurements coincide with the attack measurements. Therefore,
the WSSE is 45.54 (clearly below the threshold) and the attack is successful. In summary, we conclude that
any single gross error can make the PCA based data-driven attack detectable.
6.4. Proposed attack strategy in the presence of gross errors (Contribution 3):
The poor performance of the PCA-based attack is due to its brittleness in the presence of gross error.
Here, we demonstrate how to construct an undetectable FDI attack by recovering the true low-dimensional
subspace of the measurement data from the noisy data. Here, we use ALM based sparse optimization
technique to approximate the measurement matrix that is very close to the true matrix by separating the
sparse gross error. The same experiment discussed in the previous section is repeated using the ALM
based method. We observe that the ALM based sparse optimization technique can approximate the true
measurement and sparse gross error very accurately, as plotted in Fig. 7. Hence, a data-driven attack is
possible based on the low-rank approximation which is very close to the true measurement matrix. In this
section, we set up an experiment where we generate a measurement matrix using 500 observations for the 54
measurement sensors of the IEEE 14 bus test system in a similar manner to that discussed in the previous
section. Next we add 1% gross errors and missing values to the measurement matrix to create a grossly
corrupted observation matrix. Here, we define gross errors as a sparse matrix with the same dimensions of
the measurement matrix but a high value, which is significantly larger than the true measurements. Once
the grossly corrupted measurement is generated, the aim of this work is to test whether the cyber-attacker
can construct an undetectable attack. Hence, we employ the ALM based method and see that undetectable
attack construction is indeed possible as the ALM method recovers a highly accurate approximation (relative
error is around 10−8) of the true measurement matrix. Here, relative error is defined as:
RE =
‖(Z−A−E)‖2
‖Z‖2
(26)
where, Z is the corrupted measurement, A and E are the approximation of the true low-rank and sparse
matrix, respectively. Fig. 7 shows the state variables and the measurement vectors under the normal and
ALM based attack cases. We observe that the estimated state variables possess a different value than
the true states (Fig. 8.[a]) and the estimated measurement follows the manipulated attack measurements
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perfectly. For this specific case, the WSSE is 32.84 which is well below the threshold. As demonstrated, the
ALM based data-driven FDI attack is successful and remains stealthy.
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Figure 8: Data-driven attack construction using the ALM method considering gross error.
6.5. Comparison of the proposed method with benchmark sparse matrix separation techniques
(Contribution 4):
In this section, we compare the performance of the proposed attack strategy in terms of accuracy and
the time-efficiency with a number of sparse optimization techniques (SVT, APG and DUAL methods)
considering three IEEE benchmark test systems (IEEE 14, 30 and 57 bus systems).
(1) The accuracy of the approximate measurement matrix (Fig. 9): The accuracy of the
approximate matrix can be determined using the relative error in Eqn. (26). In this section we measure the
performance of the ALM method in terms of accuracy- how close the approximations are to the true subspace.
We also compare the performance against three other established algorithms. Here, we consider the IEEE
14 bus test system. First we generate a measurement vector based on the operating point defined in the test
system using MATPOWER. Next, we generate a measurement matrix by considering 500 time instances
where the state vectors at different time instances are Gaussian random vectors (i.i.d) with the same mean
equal to the operating condition. To include the effect of the gross errors, we add a sparse matrix that has
the same dimension as the true measurement matrix with random values that are significantly higher than
the true measurements. We apply Algorithm 1 to the grossly corrupted matrix to construct an undetectable
attack vector using the ALM, APG, SVT and Dual methods. For each method we repeat the procedure 100
times considering different measurement realizations, Gaussian noise (SNR between 20dB ∼ 35dB), 1% and
5% sparse gross errors. For each method we report the relative approximation error. Similar experiments
were performed for the IEEE 30 bus and 57 bus test systems. All results are shown in Fig. 9 For all
test setups, we consider maximum iteration equal to 3000 for all methods and initial conditions as defined
in [35, 29, 30]. From Fig. 9, we see that the best performing algorithm in terms of less relative error is
the proposed ALM method and the second best algorithm is the APG method. The other two methods,
SVT and Dual, have higher relative errors than the the ALM and APG based methods. The ALM method
produces less relative error for both 1% and 5% sparsity as the low-dimensional approximation of the true
measurements is more accurate for this algorithm than for the three other methods.
(2) The time-efficiency of the attack construction (Fig. 10): The attack construction also needs
to meet a time requirement to increase its probability of becoming stealthy. If the time required for attack
construction is too high, the power system operating conditions may change and this will increase the
probability of the attack being detected. Hence, in this section we measure the performance of the ALM
method in terms of efficiency- how fast can it generate an attack. We will compare the performance against
three other well-performed algorithms.
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Figure 9: Accuracy of approximating measurement matrix using Relative error (RE) of the proposed method
compared with different sparse optimization techniques (APG, SVT and Dual methods).
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Figure 10: Time-efficiency for attack construction of the proposed method compared with different sparse
optimization techniques (APG, SVT and Dual methods).
The time requirement of the above discussed scenarios for all four algorithms is plotted in Fig. 10.
Although the APG based method has close accuracy to the ALM based method (as seen in the previous
section), it performs poorly in terms of solution speed as evident from Fig. 10. For example, the ALM based
attack construction method takes less than 1 s (as low as 0.11s for the 14 bus test case) for all three test
systems. On the other hand, the APG based attack construction method takes a minimum of 7.2s (average
7.22s) for the 14 bus test system and 62.9s (average 63.5) for the 57 bus test system. Therefore, the ALM
method outperforms the APG method as it has lower relative errors and faster processing capabilities, as
observed for all three test systems in all test setups. The SVT and the Dual methods also require longer
computational time.
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7. Conclusion
The vulnerability of smart grid state estimation to an FDI attack was highlighted in this paper. Existing
attack strategies assume some system information is known, including the Jacobian matrixH and the number
of system states (n) is known to the adversary. In practice, neither the information on H nor n is available
to the adversary. This paper proposed a technique that can create an attack vector without knowing H
or n. We have shown that the stealthiness of the PCA based existing blind attack cannot be guaranteed
if the measurement data contains any gross errors. We have argued that an attacker can circumvent this
problem by using an alternative form of attack. Here, we proposed an ALM based attack construction
strategy where the original low dimensional measurement matrix (based on what the attacker can generate
in a blind attack) can be approximated by using sparse optimization. With extensive experiments that
consider multiple benchmark test systems, we have demonstrated that an attacker can successfully inject
ALM based hidden FDI attacks in the presence of gross errors. Different sparse optimization based attack
strategies are considered to validate the proposed method. This paper concludes that the proposed ALM
based FDI attack can be generated without prior system knowledge and state information and can handle
different types of noise cases e.g., Gaussian errors, and grossly corrupted measurements more efficiently (in
time) than existing techniques. Effective detection and prevention techniques for these types of attack are
under preparation and will be presented in future work.
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